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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHAT DO HOUSE PRICES AND INCOME INEQUALITY TELL ABOUT 
FINANCE AND GROWTH ? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the dynamic effects of credit supply on economic growth and the short- 
and long-term relationship between house prices and income inequality in 18 OECD 
countries. It was found that increased income inequality expands credit supply in the short 
term but reduces credit supply in the long term. Increasing house prices contribute positively 
to greater credit supply and drive economic growth. However, when house prices are higher 
than long-run equilibrium levels, credit supply can negatively contribute to economic growth. 
Finally, income inequality has a negative influence on the effect of credit supply on economic 
growth when it is at a higher phase than the long-run equilibrium level. These results suggest 
that when an excessive increase in house prices and income inequality occurs, it is necessary 
to consider the possibility that increasing credit supply may not boost economic growth is 
necessary. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 Financial development has been accepted to promote investment and expenditure by 
relaxing the financial constraints faced by the main agents of the economy (Goldsmith, 
1969; King and Levine, 1993). Levine (2005) finds that financial development contributes 
to economic growth through five main financial functions: production and allocation of 
information, efficient monitoring and exertion of corporate governance, management of risk, 
efficient mobilization of savings, and improvements in the exchange of goods and services. 
Research prior to the global financial crisis (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; 
Rioja and Valev, 2004) agreed that financial development leads to economic growth, but 
some studies since the crisis indicate that financial development does not necessarily 
contribute positively to economic growth. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012, 2015) 
demonstrate that much collateral and supply of finance is distributed to parts of the 
economy with lower productivity in developed countries with relatively higher financial 
development. Moreover, outstanding employees cluster around the financial industry, thus 
causing a decrease in technological innovation and productivity in the economy as a whole. 
This finding implies that financial development actually hinders economic growth, and it 
provides a counter argument to the belief that the contribution of the financial industry 
increases as the economy grows (Rioja and Valev, 2004). 
 A number of studies on the financial crisis found that when credit is limited to 
specific industries, it may lead to asset price bubbles, which may lead to systemic failure 
when they finally burst and worsen the instability of the economy (Minsky, 1982; Shin, 
2010; Muellbauer, 2010). Shin (2010) provides a theoretical model to explain that the 
instability of the real economy arising from the process of asset price boom and burst is 
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caused and intensified by internal systemic factors, such as market risk management 
techniques and evaluation systems including Value at Risk (VaR) and Asset-Liability 
Management (ALM). In particular, the importance of the real estate sector was reaffirmed 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that the supply of 
real estate assets is limited in the short term and short selling is impossible, and is thus 
fragile to optimistic view. They also claim that the supply of real estate assets causes great 
financial instability. Muellbauer (2007, 2010, 2013) emphasizes that in the interdependence 
between the financial and the real sector, the household sector plays a more important role 
than the investment-centered corporate sector. 
 Since the global financial crisis, concern regarding income inequality (or income 
distribution) has increased. With respect to the effect of financial development on income 
inequality, previous research suggests that financial development directly offers investment 
opportunities to small businesses that lack collateral, provides higher human capital 
formation through education of low-income groups, and indirectly helps mitigate income 
inequality by providing jobs to unskilled workers through investment (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2009). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Clarke et al. (2006) argue that 
increased financial supply exacerbates inequality just before the economy reaches maturity, 
but the economy contributes to improving inequality once it is matured. Nevertheless, 
although the majority of research supports the positive effect of mitigating income 
inequality by reducing informational barriers or high transaction costs faced by small firms 
(Beck et al., 2008), some studies (ILO, 2008) stress that increased economic volatility and 
the side effects of an economic crisis can cause a relatively large shock to low-income 
groups. 
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 Many studies suggest that increased income inequality escalates indebtedness in the 
private sector and may possibly lead to a financial crisis, which negatively affects economic 
growth. Previous research on economic crises (Stiglitz, 2009; Rajan, 2010; Fitoussi and 
Saraceno, 2009; Perugini et al., 2015) indicates that the main cause of a financial crisis is 
intensified inequality. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) and Iacoviello (2008) empirically found 
that increased household debt is related to intensified inequality. Kumhof et al. (2013) 
propose a theoretical framework that endogenously determines the increase in the income of 
higher-income groups and borrowing in the lower-mid group and increase in the likelihood 
of a financial crisis. Perugini et al. (2015) demonstrate the relationship between financial 
crisis and inequality through an analysis of 18 OECD countries from 1970–2007. They 
argue that the previous perspective that distribution of income has no bearing on 
macroeconomic stability should be reconsidered, and that monetary and financial 
policymakers should pay more attention to income distribution to improve stability in the 
financial system. 
 Galor and Zeira (1993), Piketty (1997), and Berg and Ostrey (2011) argue that 
increased income inequality inhibits economic growth because it disrupts the formation of 
human capital in low-income groups. Barro (2000) states that while deepening the 
inequality in income harms economic growth in mature economies, it promotes growth in 
underdeveloped countries.  
 Angeles (2015) shows from evidences that corporate lending contributes positively to 
economic growth, while household debt increases the possibility of a financial crisis, which 
implies that although credit expansion promotes economic growth, there is the drawback 
that a financial crisis may also occur as a result. In addition, corporate lending increases 
economic growth by allowing firms to purchase raw materials and build up capital, but 
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household debt does little to help growth as most are only used for consumption-smoothing, 
with the exception of tuition loans which help develop human capital. 
 Research introduced so far can be summarized as follows: the level of credit supply is 
highly correlated to income inequality and house prices, and the effect of credit supply on 
economic growth can differ according to income inequality and house prices. Whereas 
previous studies focus mostly on the partial relationship between the two variables, this 
paper closely examines the short- and long-term relationships among economic growth, 
credit supply, house prices and income inequality. That is, in consideration of economic 
growth, credit supply, house prices, and income inequality as endogenous variables that 
interact with one another, this study examines the existence of long-run equilibrium 
relationships among the variables and the short-term effects using panel time-series 
analyses such as cointegration test and error correction model (ECM). In particular, this 
study considers interdependence and heterogeneity among countries, and thus the empirical 
analysis is conducted around the pooled mean group estimator (PMG). 
 An empirical analysis of the long- and short-term relationships among economic 
growth, credit supply, house prices, and income inequality shows that, in the long run, 
credit supply is dependent on the level of economic growth, house prices, and income 
inequality; house prices are determined by income inequality; and income inequality is 
affected by credit supply. Increased income inequality expands credit supply in the short 
term but reduces it in the long term. Increased house prices contributes positively to greater 
credit supply and drives economic growth. Conversely, credit supply negatively contributes 
to economic growth when house prices are higher than the long-run equilibrium level. This 
effect is likely due to the procyclicality caused by the interaction between credit supply and 
house prices. Consequently, income inequality has a negative influence on the effect of 
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credit supply on economic growth when it is at a higher phase than the long-run equilibrium 
level. With this result, this paper provides detailed evidence to the argument by Angeles 
(2015) that household debt is strongly correlated to financial crisis, and the argument by 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012, 2015) that in developed countries financial development 
may hinder economic growth. Hence, when variables which are closely linked to an 
increase in household debt are above their long-term equilibrium levels, credit supply 
adversely affects economic growth in the short-run. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the hypotheses are presented and 
developed. Section 3 analyze the long-run equilibrium relationships and short-term effects 
among economic growth, credit growth, house prices and income inequality through panel 
time-series analyses. Section 4 examines the influence of house prices and income 
inequality on the effect of credit supply on economic growth, followed by a conclusion in 
Section 5. 
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Ⅱ. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Based on studies by Angeles (2015) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012, 2015)  
which present differing views from the previous, traditional ones regarding the impact of 
credit expansion on economic growth, this study starts with the assumptions that the effect 
of credit supply on economic growth varies according to income inequality (income 
distribution) and house price levels. This assumption is more likely to occur when credit 
supply is closely related to household sectors than to corporate sectors, because household 
demands for funds have a close relationship with the shortage of living expenses driven by 
low income and home ownership.  
 As income inequality deepens, banks face a new environment in which there is an 
increased demand for loans from low-income groups, who need funds to pay for their daily 
expenses. However, it is clear that banks benefit from an increased level of credit supply 
from high-income groups as their savings increase. As a consequence of more savings and 
loan demands, an overall increase in the level of credit supply can be anticipated. This 
coincides with the argument that increased income inequality is a cause of increased 
household debt as seen in previous research (Stiglitz, 2009; Rajan, 2010; Fitoussi and 
Saraceno, 2009; Perugini et al., 2015). 
 Previous studies present contradicting stances on whether income inequality has an 
effect on house prices. Herring and Wachter (1999) show that, unlike other assets, houses 
are in limited supply in preferred residential areas, and short selling is difficult. Therefore, 
houses are vulnerable to upward pressure on prices, and income inequality increases the 
reservation prices of high-income groups, which have superior financing capacity. Many 
empirical studies (Gyourko et al., 2013; Moretti, 2011) also argue that widening the income 
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gap increases regional house price differentiation. However, Määttänen and Terviö (2014) 
argue that greater income inequality does not cause house prices to increase overall; rather, 
it decreases house prices on average. Acknowledging regional differences in house prices 
due to increased income inequality, price increases in preferred residential areas is expected. 
In this case, borrowing for house purchases should increase for mid- to high-income groups. 
 Whereas increased savings in high-income groups improves the lending capacity of 
financial firms, the higher financing demand of low-income groups which have a 
deteriorated repayment capacity increases the credit risk of a bank loan. If banks apply strict 
lending standards in such circumstances, in other words, decreased loan opportunities for 
low-income families with less repayment capacity, existing loan customers in the upper-
middle group will enjoy improved credit accessibility. Therefore, the benefits of improved 
lending capacity are likely to reach the upper middle class. In this case, an improvement in 
bank credit supply extends income inequality. This is particularly worse in an environment 
where sufficient demand by the upper-middle class exists for loans to buy homes. However, 
if the upper-middle class demands financing below the supply capacity of banks, banks will 
inevitably ease their lending standards and expand their targets to low-income groups. 
H1. Increased income inequality triggers credit expansion and raises the price of homes. 
 As income inequality increases, the improvement in the credit supply capacity of 
financial institutions due to the increase in savings of high-income groups benefits 
mainly the existing customer base and further intensifies income inequality. 
 A number of studies including that of IMF (2009, 2011) show a high correlation 
between house prices and household debt. Given that an increase in asset prices increases 
the collateral value, rising collateral value promotes credit supply. However, credit 
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expansion may lead to a bubble through the interaction between asset price. Muellbauer 
(2007, 2010) emphasizes the importance of the housing market in macroeconomics by 
highlighting the change of credit supply driven by financial firm's capital change having 
close relationship with the housing market. Shin (2010) also presents a theoretical model in 
which asset prices interact with credit supply to endogenously generate rising and falling 
phases.  
 If credit supply interacts with house prices to endogenously cause or deepen the 
change in house prices, then when houses are priced above their long-term equilibrium 
levels credit supply helps form an asset bubble or distribute resources in less productive 
areas, and thus it is difficult to expect a positive effect of credit supply on the economy. 
H2. Increased house price generally contributes to greater credit supply. 
In consideration of the endogenous procyclicality caused by the interaction between 
credit supply and asset price, the contribution of credit to economic growth is 
limited or negative in times of positive deviation from the long-run house price. 
 As seen in Hypothesis 1, increased credit supply deepens income inequality as it 
benefits only the existing players, and hence as suggested by Barro (2000) and Berg and 
Ostrey (2011), income inequality adversely affects economic growth. If this is the case, an 
increase in credit supply would impair economic growth, as it is diverted to less productive 
areas of the economy such as providing loans for low-income to cover their living expenses. 
H3.As improvement in the credit supply capacity of financial institutions further 
intensifies income inequality according to Hypothesis 1, the contribution of credit to 
economic growth is limited or negative in times of positive deviation from the long-
run income inequality. 
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Ⅲ. PANEL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS 
1. Data 
 To analyze the short- and long-term relationships among economic growth, credit 
supply, house prices, and income inequality, the annual panel time-series data from 18 
developed countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1981 to 
2010 was used. The panel time-series analysis is useful because it complements country-
specific time-series analyses that have statistical weaknesses, such as sample size restriction. 
The variables used are gross domestic product(GDP per capita), Credit-to-GDP ratio, House 
Price Index (HPI), and the GINI Index. 
 GDP per capita and Credit-to-GDP ratio were obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator (WDI) database. House Price Index was obtained from the house 
price database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas which includes the long-run 
residential property price index researched by the Bank for International Settlements. GINI 
index was taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, a time-series 
database based on the results of the Luxembourg Income Study, which provides a 
standardized way to compare across countries. GDP per capita, Credit-to-GDP ratio and 
House Price Index are the real variables. Four variables, including the GINI Index, are 
natural log-transformed. 
 In this study, 18 developed countries were selected with thorough consideration of 
the availability of long-term time-series data such as house price and a high levels of 
financial development in the target countries. The study was partially limited to developed 
countries to obtain long-term time-series data. Nevertheless, it allows for variations caused 
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by differences in level of economic and financial development to be controlled. As this 
study uses annual data from 30 year span(1981 to 2010), it provides an excellent 
environment to analyze the effect of credit supply on economic growth in a developed 
financial market. Beginning in 1980, countries witnessed a global increase in financial 
market liberalization, which inevitably led to greater market efficiency. However, macro-
economic shocks such as financial crises of different magnitudes were also observed. 
     Table 1-1. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Ln(GDP) Ln(Credit) Ln(GINI) Ln(HPI) 
Mean 10.89 4.479 3.336 4.284 
Median 10.37 4.504 3.343 4.288 
Maximum 15.23 5.428 3.632 5.109 
Minimum 9.38 3.031 2.956 3.205 
Std. Dev. 1.37 0.505 0.151 0.387 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
 
  
Figure 1-1. Trends over 30 years among variables(mean value) 
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2. Unit Root Test and Panel Cointegration Test 
 In the panel time-series analysis, macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, 
Credit-to-GDP ratio, House Price Index, and GINI index are tested for non-stationarity. The 
following panel model is estimated: 
 
 
Table 1-2. Results of the Panel Unit Root Test (p-value) 
 Common unit root process Individual unit root process 
 LLC Breitung Hadri IPS ADF-Fisher 
Ln(GDP) 0.916 0.987 0.000 0.598 0.701 
Ln(Credit) 0.049 0.630 0.000 0.765 0.795 
Ln(HPI) 0.060 0.073 0.000 0.115 0.084 
Ln(GINI) 0.191 0.295 0.000 0.314 0.213 
  Note : For unit root verification, the test that includes individual effects and individual linear 
trends was used. For the automatic selection of lag length, Schwarz’s method, the 
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection, and the Bartlett kernel method were 
used. 
 
  As presented in Table 1-2, five panel unit root verification tests show that all series 
are non-stationary. The processes used are LLC, Breitung and Hadri, which assume a 
common unit root process, and Im, Pesaran, and Shin and ADF–Fisher verification, which 
assume an individual unit root process. Although the LLC verification of Credit-to-GDP 
ratio rejects the assumption of the existence of a unit root, it is shown to be a non-stationary 
time-series in all other tests. These results suggest the possibility that a simultaneous 
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correlation exists in the Credit-to-GDP ratio variable (O’Connell, 1998). The four variables 
become a stable time-series at the 1% level in the first-order differential. 
 With the unit root tests, confirmation that variables are I(1) and non-stationary was 
possible, and thus further verifications were conducted to test whether the linear 
combination of variables form stationarity. The following cointegration ECM model of 
Westerlund (2007) is implemented: 
 
 The above model reflects different constant terms and trend terms for each i, and it 
assumes an independence of error terms for different i and t. The coefficient estimate α, 
which refers to adjustment speed, is less than zero if cointegration exists, and is equal to 
zero if no such relationship exists. Westerlund (2007) presents a group average test statistic 
that sets the alternative hypothesis that a cointegration relationship is present at least for one 
i, and a panel test statistics that verifies the alternative hypothesis that cointegration exists 
for all i. The same model is applied to Credit-to-GDP ratio, GINI index, and GDP per capita, 
but no cointegration relationship occurs in almost all models. However, a bootstrap method 
can be used if interdependence exists among the cross-sections of the panel (Persyn and 
Westerlund, 2008). The possibility of a cointegration relationship among Credit-to-GDP 
ratio, House Price Index, and GINI index exists using this method, as shown in Table 1-3. 
For Credit-to-GDP ratio, a cointegration relationship seems to exist in both cases regarding 
the addition of aconstant term. However, for GINI index and House price index, models 
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including and excluding the constant term, respectively, show the possibility of a 
cointegration. 
  Table 1-3. Results of the ECM Panel Cointegration Test 
Constant: o & Trend: x 
 Gt Ga Pt Pa 
Ln(GDP) 0.970 0.960 0.950 0.910 
Ln(Credit) 0.010 0.410 0.140 0.240 
Ln(HPI) 0.550 0.580 0.440 0.300 
Ln(GINI) 0.030 0.310 0.190 0.470 
Constant: x & Trend: x 
 Gt Ga Pt Pa 
Ln(GDP) 1.000 1.000 0.940 0.940 
Ln(Credit) 0.000 0.230 0.050 0.050 
Ln(HPI) 0.240 0.050 0.240 0.200 
Ln(GINI) 0.720 0.870 0.800 0.850 
 
3. Granger Causality Test 
 To analyze the lead–lag relationship among variables, a Granger causality test was 
conducted. Figure 1-2 shows the relationship between the pairwise Granger causality test, 
which assumes common coefficients, and the pairwise Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality 
test, which assumes individual coefficients. 
 The tests assuming common coefficients show that the variables granger-cause one 
another in the following manner. GINI Index causes House Price Index; House Price Index 
causes GDP per capita and Credit-to-GDP Ratio; credit supply causes economic growth and 
income inequality; and economic growth causes House Price Index. In the tests assuming 
individual coefficients, income inequality may cause economic growth; economic growth 
causes credit supply; and credit supply causes income inequality. 
 
  
Figure 1-2. Result of the Granger 
Note: *** and** denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively, and the dotted lines 
indicate significance only for the
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estimation equations for each panel group and applies a seemingly unrelated regression. 
Therefore, PMG estimation is preferred if a simultaneous correlation exists among the panel 
groups. 
 
ECM estimation for Credit-to-GDP Ratio 
 The ECM estimation model for Credit-to-GDP Ratio is as follows: 
 
  Table 1-4. Results of the ECM panel cointegration estimation:∆ln(Credit-to-GDP Ratio) 
 PMG (1) DFE (2) PMG (3) POLS (4) 
α -0.1733*** -0.1611*** -0.0655*** -0.0636*** 
β 0.6053*** 0.8287*** 0.9680*** 0.8899*** 
γ 0.8748*** 0.7561** 0.0565*** 0.0220 
δ -0.7069*** -1.2924** -0.0229* 0.2359 
τ1	or	Mean(τ1) 0.2484 0.1620** 0.0202 0.2863*** 
τ2 or Mean(τ2) 0.1241 0.1592 0.3794 0.2234 
τ3or Mean(τ3) -0.1955 -0.0343 -0.0623 -0.0286 
τ4 or Mean(τ4) 0.2326 0.3636 0.2722 0.1861 
R2 - 0.1544 - 0.1574 
 
 DFE and PMG estimates are used for models that include constant terms, and POLS 
and PMG estimates are used for those that exclude constant terms. The results are shown in 
Table 1-4, which indicate that long-run equilibrium relationships exist, and that they deviate 
from the equilibrium applied adjustment speed of 17% at the most, depending on the model 
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used. In the long-term relationship, House Price Index and GDP per capita are in a positive 
relationship with Credit-to-GDP Ratio in most models including PMG. This finding shows 
that higher house prices and income contribute to credit expansion. From the Models (1) 
and (2) including constant terms, a negative relationship between GINI Index and Credit to 
GDP ratio can be witnessed. Also present in the short-term relationship is the positive effect 
of house price and income growth on credit growth. For the income inequality index 
estimated from the GINI Index, it could be said that greater income inequality increases 
credit growth in the short term, while it reduces credit portion in the long term. In other 
words, in the above estimation model, the coefficient ( τ4 ) showing the short-term 
relationship between income inequality growth and credit growth has an opposite sign of 
the coefficient (δ), which represents the long-term relationship. 
 PMG (1) model estimates consider panel group interdependence and heterogeneity, 
and allow for the differences in coefficients across countries. House price growth 
(∆ln(House price index)) coefficients (τ1) are statistically significant in seven countries and 
positive in five of them. Income growth (∆ln(GDP per capita)) coefficients (τ2 ) are 
significant in ten countries and positive in eight of them. Income inequality growth 
coefficients (τ4) are significant in six countries and positive in five of them. 
 
ECM estimation for House Price Index 
 The ECM estimation model for house price is shown as follows: 
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Table 1-5. Results of the ECM panel cointegration estimation : ∆ln(House Price Index) 
 PMG (1) POLS (2) 
α -0.0457*** -0.0383*** 
β 0.0503** 0.0626 
γ 0.1007 0.1410 
δ 1.0438*** 0.9556*** 
τ1	or	Mean(τ1) 0.8045 0.4244*** 
τ2 or Mean(τ2) 0.0094 0.3554*** 
τ3or Mean(τ3) -0.2475 0.0173 
τ4 or Mean(τ4) 0.0313 -0.1771 
R2 - 0.3752 
 
 The model excludes the constant term because the cointegration test results are 
reflected. As the constant term is excluded, the POLS model is estimated instead of DFE, 
and the PMG model is estimated considering the simultaneous correlation among the panel 
groups. The results are shown in Table 1-5.  
 Income (GDP per capita) displays a positive and significant relationship with house 
price in the long run, and a positive and relatively strong relationship in the short term 
(0.3554). A greater level of income inequality increases house price in the long term but has 
no effect in the short term. House prices have a relatively large continuity (0.4244), but the 
adjustment speed for a long-run equilibrium relationship shows a small value that falls short 
of 5%. 
 Furthermore, panel cross-country PMG estimation results that show coefficient 
estimates displaying short-term relationships confirm that increasing credit has a significant 
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effect on house price growth only in three of the countries. Moreover, a greater level of 
income inequality has a negative effect on house price growth in four countries. 
 
ECM estimation for the GINI index 
 The ECM estimation model for the GINI index is as follows.  
 
 The cointegration test results are implemented, and the DFE and PMG estimates, 
including the constant terms, are calculated. The results are shown in Table 1-6. 
 
 Table 1-6.Results of the ECM panel cointegration estimation:∆ln(GINI Index) 
 PMG DFE 
α -0.0888** -0.0985*** 
β  -0.0079 -0.0315 
γ -0.0518 0.0508 
δ 0.0721*** 0.0538 
τ1	or	Mean(τ1) 0.0102 0.0188 
τ2 or Mean(τ2) -0.1818 -0.0584 
τ3or Mean(τ3) 0.0721 -0.0044 
τ4 or Mean(τ4) 0.0222 0.3460*** 
R2 - 0.1838 
 
In the DFE estimation, no statistically significant long-run relationship with other variables 
is found. However, in the PMG estimation, Credit-to-GDP Ratio is shown to have a positive 
relationship with GINI index. In other words, increasing credit may extend the level of 
  
income inequality. The adjustment speed for a long
short-term relationships, rather than being influen
income inequality seems to continue relatively well (0.3460).
PMG estimation results for coefficients that represent short
countries show statistically significant e
which show that increasing economic growth rate reduces the income inequality levels in 
the short term. Five countries show coefficients that are significant for house price growth 
and credit growth, but the signs are mixed.
The ECM estimates on Credit
summarized in Figure 1-3. These results match exactly when GDP per capita is exclud
The ECM estimation is not conducted on GDP per capita
comparing causality through the Granger causality test.
 
Figure 1-3. Long-run Relationship 
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-to-GDP Ratio, House Price Index, and GINI Index are 
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Ⅳ. CONTRIBUTION OF FINANCE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 This chapter analyzed the effect of financing on economic growth. Although many 
studies support the view that financial development promotes economic growth, others 
argue that this view is poorly evidenced (Favara, 2003) and that financial development 
actually hinders growth (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, 2015). This chapter shows that the 
effect of financing on economic growth depends on the levels of Credit-to-GDP Ratio, 
House Price Index, and GINI index. According to the analyses conducted in Chapter 3, 
Credit-to-GDP Ratio, House Price Index, and GINI Index have a significant linear 
relationship with GDP per capita in the long term. The following model is used to analyze 
how the effect of credit supply on economic growth varies when Credit-to-GDP Ratio, 
House Price Index, and GINI Index are in excess or below the long-run equilibrium 
relationship. 
∆Yi,t =α + β*∆Yi,t-1 + λ*∆Xi,t*(Di,t) +δ*Zi,t +εi,t 
  Table 1-7. Summary Statistics of the Variables (2) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
∆Ln(GDP) 0.0175 0.0229 -0.0911 0.0923 
∆Ln(Credit) 0.0330 0.1174 -0.8449 1.3538 
∆Ln(HPI) 0.0205 0.0735 -0.4754 0.2352 
∆Ln(GINI) 0.0037 0.0203 -0.0763 0.1027 
Ln(Population growth) 1.7148 0.0818 1.5119 2.0335 
Ln(Investment rates) 3.1283 0.1867 2.6185 3.5769 
Ln(Education levels) 2.2808 0.1758 1.7244 2.5724 
Trade Openness 59.7717 32.9883 11.8349 172.372 
  Source: Investment/GDP, Population Growth, Trade Openness, and Education Level 
(average years of primary and secondary schooling) variables were collected from 
Ostry et al. (2014).  
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 The dependent variable (∆Y) is the log-transformed differential of GDP per capita, 
and ∆Xis the differential that includes the endogenous explanatory variables Credit-to-GDP 
Ratio, House Price Index, and GINI Index. The variables are converted to stable time-series 
through differences. D indicates dummy variables that show whether Credit-to-GDP Ratio, 
House Price Index, and GINI Index are in excess or below the long-run equilibrium level. 
Long-run equilibrium levels are calculated from the estimated equation in section 3. Z is an 
explanatory variable that represents the factors affecting economic growth, namely, 
investment rates, population growth, trade openness, and education levels. 
 The dynamic panel model estimation uses lagged dependent variables as explanatory 
variables, and causes the problem of a biased estimator. Therefore, many methodologies to 
correct this issue have been developed. Studies on economic growth generally use the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates. However, Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
show through Monte Carlo simulations that DFE and system GMM(SGMM) estimates 
perform equally well if the main purpose is to estimate endogenous explanatory variables. 
Therefore, using Credit-to-GDP Ratio, House Price Index, and GINI Index as explanatory 
variables, this study performed DFE and SGMM estimations. The results are shown in 
Table 1-8. 
 In the DFE estimation of Model (1), the results are statistically insignificant for the 
effect of Credit-to-GDP Ratio on economic growth. In the SGMM estimates of Model (2), 
economic growth rate (∆ln(GDP per capita)) decreases as Credit-to-GDP Ratio increases. 
 In particular, Models (3) and (4) show that the negative effect of increased credit on 
economic growth rate is evident when house prices are above the long-run equilibrium level. 
The coefficient for Model (4) at -0.1442 is much greater than that for Model (2) at -0.0162.  
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Table 1-8. Results of the estimation : Dep. Variable is ∆ln(GDP per capita) 
Model DFE (1) 
SGMM 
(2) 
DFE 
(3) 
SGMM 
(4) 
DFE 
(5) 
SGMM 
(6) 
∆ln(GDP per capita)t-1 0.2474*** 0.2539*** 0.2441*** 0.2556*** 0.2483*** 0.2563*** 
∆ln(credit to GDP) -0.0077 -0.0162**     
∆ln(house price) 0.1199*** 0.1242*** 0.1199*** 0.1234*** 0.1198*** 0.1245*** 
∆ln(GINI index) 0.0531 0.0737 0.0463 0.0646 0.0521 0.0716 
∆ln(credit to GDP) * 
D(ln(HP) > LR value)   -0.0985
*** -0.1442***   
∆ln(Credit to GDP) * 
D(ln(HP) < LR value)   -0.0011 -0.0059   
∆ln(credit to GDP) * 
D(ln(GINI) > LR value)     -0.0103 -0.0228
** 
∆ln(credit to GDP) * 
D(ln(GINI) < LR value)     -0.0059 -0.0111 
ln(population growth) -0.0585*** -0.0770*** -0.0487*** -0.0650*** -0.0589*** -0.0780*** 
ln(Investment to GDP) 0.0162* 0.0302*** 0.0228** 0.0395*** 0.0160* 0.0296*** 
ln(education rate) -0.0353*** -0.0156 -0.0372*** -0.0155 -0.0352*** -0.0157 
Trade openness -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0002*** 
Within R2 0.3277 - 0.3474 - 0.3279 - 
Obs(groups) 504(18) 504(18) 504(18) 504(18) 504(18) 504(18) 
 
This finding asserts that the effect of increasing credit on economic growth differs greatly 
according to house price levels. Models (5) and (6) show a negative effect of increased 
credit on economic growth rate when income inequality is above the long-run equilibrium 
level. Combining the results of Chapter 3 on the relationship between income inequality and 
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credit, which indicates that greater income inequality leads to reduced credit in the long run 
but induces higher credit levels in the short term, with the above results, this finding implies 
that such an short-term increase in credit affects economic growth negatively when income 
inequality is well above its long-run equilibrium level. 
 The effect of house price growth on economic growth rate is shown to be around 
11%–12%. However, the results do not confirm the significance of the level of income 
inequality, whereas income inequality granger-causes economic growth in the results 
conducted through the Granger causality test. 
 For the added control variables that explain economic growth, the effect of 
population growth on economic growth rate is negative, and investment rate has a positive 
relationship with economic growth as expected. However, education level and trade 
openness have coefficients with signs that were either not expected or insignificant. The 
reason for this finding may be due to the limitation of this study which only analyzed the 
short-term effects in 18 OECD countries.  
 
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION 
 An analysis of 18 OECD developed countries confirms that a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among economic growth, credit supply, house prices, and income inequality is 
present. That is, both rising house prices and income increase credit, while widened income 
inequality decreases credit. House prices increase with income and income inequality, and 
income inequality increases with increased credit supply. The estimation results of the effect 
of credit supply on economic growth show that an increase in credit percentage has a 
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negative effect on economic growth. The results also confirm that this effect is greater when 
house price and income inequality are above the long-run equilibrium level. 
 As discussed above, credit supply, house prices, income inequality, and economic 
growth form a close relationship with one another. This finding implies a need to consider 
the effect that overshooting or undershooting in a specific area has on other areas when 
establishing macro-stabilization policies. Rather than making policies based on the absolute 
size of the credit supply itself, the fact that the effectiveness of credit supply in economic 
growth may vary with the levels of house price and income inequality should also be 
considered. When an excessive increase in house prices and income inequality exists, 
consideration of the possibility that increasing the credit supply may not boost economic 
growth is necessary. 
  As this study focuses on the effect of credit supply on annual economic growth rate, it 
does not comprehensively explain the fact that economic growth is witnessed in the mid-
long term. An interesting area for future research would be to include the outbreak of a 
crisis as a variable in the analysis, since a drawback of increased credit supply on 
economic growth can be seen as a financial crisis (Angeles, 2015). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF BANK MONITORING ON FIRM VALUE 
DEPENDING ON DEFAULT POSSIBILITY AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of bank financing on corporate value through the study of 
KOSPI listed companies from 2003 to 2013. It use the bank loan ratio as a proxy variable for 
the level of bank monitoring. The analysis results showed that a higher bank loan ratio 
negatively affected firm value for financially troubled companies with an interest coverage 
ratio below 1. And for companies with a centralized ownership structure where controlling 
shareholders have 35% or more shares, a higher bank loan ratio positively affected firm value. 
This paper also confirmed that bank monitoring effects can differ between firms with high 
default risk and those with concentrated ownership structure through an event study analysis 
regarding the impact of the announcement of a unique Korean bank monitoring system of 
MDG designation on corporate stock price. Negative effects were observed in cases of firms 
with a high default risk, whereas positive ones in case of firms with concentrated ownership 
structure. These results of this analysis are generally the same as those which use a bank loan 
ratio variable. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 There are varying views on the primary goal of a corporation, including profit 
maximization, pursuit of shareholder value and interests of stakeholders. In analysis of 
corporate finance, increasing corporate value in the market is usually considered the primary 
goal. Companies decide whether to invest in particular projects, and raise funds internally or 
from the outside, and the validity of these decisions is determined by whether they increase 
corporate value. A company’s capital structure depends on the specific funding methods for 
investment, and according to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) 
and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), several factors—e.g. corporate tax, 
default risks, or the presence or absence of agency problems—affect the influence of debt 
financing on corporate value. Bank loans and corporate bonds are the two most commonly 
used debt financing methods. Previous studies show that both borrowing from banks and 
raising capital in the market have comparative advantages in terms of monitoring effect 
(Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011) and effect of price information 
provision (Allen, 1993; Boot and Thaker, 1997; Russ and Valderrama, 2012). In practice, 
operation of the financial system and the influence of financing on corporate value are 
influenced by various factors such as the development stage of financial institutions and 
financial markets. 
 It is generally accepted that financial system contributes to economy performance 
through capital allocation function and economic growth is highly correlated with financial 
development (Levine, 2005). Even though the role and gravity of the banks in a specific 
country is versatile, a banking system is crucial in successful and efficient capital allocation. 
This is because banks generally play an important role in examining firms' quality, and 
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disciplining them through creditor rights enforcement. The substantial influence of banks as 
creditors on debtors may vary depending on the economic and legal systems. For example, 
under the environment of a chronic suffering in financing through capital markets, heavy 
reliance on bank borrowing of companies will appear, and as a result, this strengthens the 
disciplinary power of the bank. Immature capital markets with vulnerable investor protection 
can also lead to a superior bargaining power of banks over bondholders. Also, under the 
chronic excess demand on money due to rapid economic expansion, creditors such as banks 
may more effectively exercise disciplinary power over their debtors.  
Korea has a bank-friendly financial system because banks form an overwhelmingly 
large proportion of the system; additionally, legal and institutional systems have given banks 
a strong oversight authority over debtors. However, with the development of capital markets, 
improved access to the capital market by firms has somewhat reduced the disciplinary power 
of banks. Large firms that have access to bonds have an incentive to repay bank loans by 
mobilizing corporate bonds to avoid the interruption of the main creditor bank. This implies 
that as capital markets develop, the role of banks become weaker. 
There is a consensus that indirect financial markets (e.g., banks) are more effective in 
reducing information asymmetry than the market. De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) emphasize that 
banks are advantageous to bondholders in that whereas bondholders rely solely on public 
information of the firm, banks benefit from economies of scale and private information about 
firms. Also, banks hold a relatively large stake in firms compared to bondholders, and thus 
have more ways to acquire private information. By acknowledging the relative strength of 
screening and monitoring function of bank loans, the positive relationship between firm 
performance and bank loan might be anticipated. 
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On the other hand, many believe that issuing bonds has a more positive effect on firm 
value than bank loans. Russ and Valderrama (2012) argue that firms prefer to finance through 
bonds since the cost of financing is cheaper in the bond market, and previous research (Bliss 
and Flannery, 2000; Ioannidou and de Dreu, 2006) which emphasizes market surveillance of 
bondholders, rating agencies, etc., values the importance of bondholders because they 
promote better decision making by management. 
Other research suggest that there might be differences in the implication of bank 
loans and corporate bonds across countries, and also depending on the state of the economy. 
De Fiore and Uhlig (2012) found that while bank loans shrink during economic downturn, 
bond financing stays relatively stable during a crisis. According to De Fiore and Uhlig (2011), 
Europe is more centered around bank financing, but bond financing is more common in the 
US. By comparing the two markets they found out that while in the US the cost of bank 
finance is higher than in Europe, there is not a significant difference in the cost of bond 
financing. Market discipline also does not work well in countries where market infrastructure 
is weak or where there heavy government intervention. 
This paper analyzes the effect of bank lending on firm value for listed companies in 
Korea. In particular, it analyzes how bank lending affects corporate value under different 
conditions, either positively or negatively. To investigate this, it is assumed that when a 
company has a higher share of bank lending, the bank has greater influence on the company, 
which in turn typically increases corporate value through stronger external monitoring which 
deters moral hazard by large shareholders or management, but negatively affects corporate 
value in cases where the bank is a main creditor bank and thus in a conflicting or a 
competitive position with the company’s shareholders. 
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The analysis results showed that for companies with a centralized ownership (35% or 
more shares held by a controlling shareholder), a higher share of bank lending led to greater 
firm value, presumably because the company is subject to stronger monitoring and the 
disciplinary power of the bank, and thus, the bank has a positive effect of preventing a 
controlling shareholder from engaging in improper activities such as pursuit of personal gains. 
In the period after the 2008 global financial crisis, a higher share of bank lending had a 
negative effect on firm value for financially troubled companies with an interest coverage 
ratio of 100% or below, which is reflected in share prices in the short term. This is 
presumably because, as the default risk rises, the creditor bank puts pressure on the company 
in a way that increases the possibility of recovering loans.  
Moreover, this paper analyzes the short-term movement of stock price using the 
event of bank-led credit risk evaluation results announcement, including the unique Korean 
bank monitoring system Main Debtor Group (MDG), as a proxy variable for bank monitoring. 
Event study analysis also showed similar results to the analysis using yearly panel data. That 
is, compared to other companies firms in MDG with symptoms of insolvency received 
negative impacts in stock price from the MDG designation and announcement and the event 
of credit risk evaluation results announcement. Companies with a concentrated ownership 
structure showed positive impacts in stock price after the MDG designation, regardless of 
whether or not they belonged to MDG. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops hypotheses that this 
paper will test. In Section III, the data, model and empirical results for panel data analysis are 
presented. Section IV analyzes the effect of cumulative abnormal return after MDG release 
and large corporate credit evaluation through the event study, followed by a conclusion in 
Section V.  
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Ⅱ. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Banks possess an advantage when determining firms’ associated risks as they 
accumulate private information in the transaction process, which other investors cannot 
obtain. In addition, because banks may impose collateral conditions in debt, monitor and 
control changes in debtor risk through post-lending surveillance (e.g., loan review after 
initiation), this may result in a reduction in moral hazard of debtors. This allows for a more 
productive allocation of limited resources through a screening function which distinguish 
more profitable projects, and a monitoring function which searches for any morally 
hazardous activities of debtors after initiation. As long as banks’ screening and monitoring 
functions work efficiently and market participants trust these activities, firms with a higher 
share of bank lending would receive more favorable evaluation given that other conditions 
such as debt ratio are equal. Datta et al. (1999) argue that firms with bank financing may 
issue bonds at a lower rate, which arises from the positive effect that bank monitoring 
provides and also the reputation-building effect that bank financing has on firms. However, if 
a bank functions inefficiently, it may hamper a firm's ability to optimize. 
Firms may raise necessary funds through bond issuance. According to the pecking 
order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), a firm will fund itself in the order of retained 
earnings, debt and equity; the theory suggests that this is mostly due to information 
asymmetry and issuing costs. Because banks and bonds are mainly used in debt issues. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) suggest a theoretical model in which firms with lower credit risk 
prefer bond issuance which gives a lower interest rate, but firms with higher credit risk resort 
to bank financing which requires a higher rate. In terms of feedback-effect banks fall behind 
capital markets. Firms that issue bonds are evaluated by many market participants for their 
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degree of risk; this is reflected in official daily bond rates, which firms may consider in their 
management decision making. Since there is a delay in the time it takes for a bank's 
monitoring results to be implemented by management, the effect of bank monitoring on firm 
performance might be weakened. 
A company with a higher share of bank lending is subject to stronger monitoring by 
banks. However, the effect of stronger monitoring on firm value could be either positive or 
negative depending on the firm’s characteristics or financial market conditions. Gorton and 
Schmid (2000) reported a positive relation between the company controlling power of banks 
and corporate performance in a test using German companies as a sample. On the contrary, 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) conducted research on the main creditor bank in Japan and 
argued that discouragement of high risk and high return investment of companies by banks 
did not result in corporate profitability improvement. Most of the existing literature regarding 
bank monitoring proved that external monitoring by banks induced improvement of corporate 
governance structure and enhanced corporate value in case of companies with weak 
governance structures (Byers et al., 2008; Ozelge, 2008; Ahn and Choi, 2009). Meanwhile, 
there are studies that proved that corporate value can be damaged as the influence of banks on 
companies becomes stronger, due to distortion of resource distribution (Sharpe, 1990) and 
decreased efficiency of business activity of the companies (Rajan, 1992; Krosner and Strahan, 
2001). In the case of Korea, a system of corporate restructuring runs led by banks exists, 
which stimulates the distribution of limited resources to more productive sectors by 
liquidating insolvent companies. Hence, in case of insolvent companies the influence of 
banks can be larger compared to the others and are more likely to receive stronger bank 
control or restructuring by banks. This will have a negative impact on stock prices in the 
short term. 
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This paper examines the effects of bank monitoring on the improvement of corporate 
value according to the ownership structure. Previous studies that examined the relation 
between executive share ratio and corporate value showed contrary results of positive relation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), negative relation (Fama, 1980; Demsetz, 1983), and nonlinear 
relation (Stulz, 1998; Morck et al., 1988). Positive relation puts stress on responsibility 
management, while negative relation points out the problem of pursuing private interest by 
the dominant stockholders. Studies that examined the relation between ownership structure 
and corporate value also reported controversial results. While Edmans and Manso (2011) 
supported dispersed ownership structure, studies including Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) 
argued that major shareholder dispersion has a negative impact on corporate value.  
Meanwhile, Lee et al. (2014) reported a nonlinear relation between dominant 
stockholder share ratio and bank loan ratio in an analysis using Korean listed companies as a 
sample. In their study, bank loan ratio significantly decreased among the companies with a 
centralized ownership structure, which implies that a motivation to avoid bank monitoring 
exists among the dominant stockholders. Lin et al. (2013) also state that firms with greater 
differences between control rights and cash-flow rights for block shareholders prefer bond 
finance to avoid intervention through close monitoring from banks. These results show the 
possibility that banks are more likely to perform monitoring on debtors than bondholders do. 
Bondholders lack ways to actively intervene management and firm’s operations, and due to 
the dispersed nature of bondholders’ ownership structure, they have relatively little incentives 
to continually monitor firms once debt contract has been initiated(Diamond, 1984, 1991). 
However, banks face much greater exposure to risk, which gives them more incentives to 
monitor firms. Since their maturity terms are shorter, they can also impose conditions to 
control risk and contingency processes (such as a loan review) to provide ways to 
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continuously monitor debtor risk, allowing them to terminate the contract when needed. This 
also implies that bank monitoring can be more effective in firms with poorer corporate 
governance or a more concentrated ownership structure.  
 
Hypothesis 1. For companies with a centralized ownership structure, a higher share 
of bank lending positively affects firm value due to stronger monitoring by banks 
and effective checks on controlling shareholders. 
 
 Next, this paper analyzes whether the effects of bank monitoring on increased 
corporate value are differentiated between companies that face a higher risk of insolvency 
and others. If creditor banks focus on the possibility of recovering loans, monitoring by banks 
might negatively affect firm value by, for instance, discouraging investment in a large project 
that has risks but could considerably increase firm value. This is because banks and 
shareholders have a symmetrical pay-off relationship. Many previous studies identified the 
issue of conflicting interests that arises when a creditor bank is involved in the borrowing 
companie's managements. That is, if the creditor bank becomes a board member, it makes 
decisions from the bank’s position rather than the company’s(Krosner and Strahan, 2001). 
The prediction is made that in a market condition with a higher risk of default and for 
companies that face a higher risk of insolvency, it is more likely that the bank would exercise 
its influence in a way that is more beneficial to the bank than for the shareholders. In a 
situation where wariness of insolvency risk increases, banks will make decisions from an 
aspect of maximization of loan retrieval (minimization of loan loss). That is, banks are likely 
to make efforts to increase loan retrieval possibility by limiting new investments such as high 
risk and high return projects and encouraging restructuring such as asset disposal (Weinstein 
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and Yafeh, 1998). This will broaden the difference of firm value between healthy firms and 
insolvent firms. That is, differences will be larger with higher bank loan ratios and stronger 
influence from banks on firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2. For financially troubled companies, the creditor bank exercises its 
influence in a way that reduces the risk of loan loss, and thus a higher share of 
bank lending negatively affects firm value. 
 
Ⅲ. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Data 
In this paper, we use KOSPI listed unbalanced panel data from 2003 to 2013 (yearly). 
This is the period during which most of the bank-led massive corporate restructuring in the 
aftermath of the 1998 Asian financial crisis had been completed, and firms’ reliance on bank 
financing had steadily decreased along with a rapid growth of capital markets. An empirical 
analysis was conducted for 5,897 datasets of 611 non-financial companies that settle their 
accounts in December. Data on the largest shareholders and shareholders with special 
interest—a proxy for ownership structure—was retrieved from FnGuide, and other data was 
drawn from KIS-value. To exclude distorting influence of extreme values, the top and bottom 
1% data were winsorized.  
The main variables used in this paper are Tobin’s Q and bank loan ratio, which are 
computed as follows. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the average market value of shares 
outstanding (ordinary and preference shares) and total debt, divided by total asset. As total 
debt and total asset are in book value, Tobin’s Q can be said to be determined by the change 
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of equity value. Hence, strictly speaking, this paper uses the change in shareholder value of 
firms that were evaluated in stock market as a dependent variable. This implies that this paper 
is more appropriate for examining the effects on the change of equity value, rather than the 
debt value itself in the analysis of the effects of bank monitoring. Bank loan ratio is computed 
as year-end floating long-term debt and long-term debt divided by total debt. Two dummy 
variables are used for grouping firms; symptoms of insolvency dummy (SID) variable is 
given to 1 if interest coverage ratio is less than 1 and the concentrated ownership dummy 
(COD) is given to 1 if the proportion of common shares controlling shareholders and its 
affiliates have exceed 36%. SID judging criteria of interest coverage ratio less than one is 
being used as a very simple index that practically determines insolvency in Korean financial 
fields. For example, the credit risk evaluation for Main Debtor Group (MDG) , which will be 
introduced in Section 4, is a unique bank monitoring system of Korea used as an important 
quantitative evaluation criterion along with debt ratio. The criteria of COD—the proportion 
of common shares controlling shareholders and its affiliates exceeding 36%—are based on 
the facts proven by Lee et al. (2014), whose study examined the difference of means of debt 
issuing according to the ownership structure and reported that bank loan ratio decreases with 
a turning point of share ratio at 36%, arguing that this is because firms dislike bank 
intervention.  
Additional explanatory variables used in estimating Tobin’s Q are as follows. First, 
for profitability measures ROA is EBITDA divided by total assets1, and for financial stability 
measure equity ratio is computed as total capital divided by total asset. Tangible fixed asset is 
divided by total assets to compute tangible fixed asset ratio, R&D expenditure is divided by 
                                                          
1  Servaes (1996) argued that firms with low profitability have a positive relation with corporate value as they are 
under discounted transaction in the market.  
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total sales to get R&D expenditure ratio, and log of total assets2 are used as explanatory 
variables. Descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in the table below.  
 
 Table 2-1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tobin's Q 5897 1.00 0.89 0.46 0.37 3.14 
Bank Loan Ratio (%) 5897 8.84 2.64 12.87 0 78.48 
Bank Loan Ratio  
by Industry Mean (%) 5897 12.17 11.34 6.36 0 59.68 
Symptoms of Insolvency 
Dummy(SID)* 5607 0.25 0 0.43 0 1.00 
Concentrated Ownership 
Dummy(COD)** 5897 0.63 1 0.48 0 1.00 
ROA (%) 5897 2.96 3.54 8.04 - 34.41 20.72 
Equity Ratio (%) 5897 55.98 55.39 19.77 8.01 96.17 
Tangible Fixed Asset  
Ratio (%) 5883 32.17 31.28 18.63 0.08 78.81 
R&D Expenditure Ratio 
(%) 5894 0.72 0.04 1.63 0 10.13 
Log (Total Asset) 5897 26.56 26.29 1.50 23.87 30.83 
 * Given to 1 if Interest Coverage Ratio is less than 1, otherwise 0. 
** Given to 1 if common shares controlling shareholders have exceed 35%, otherwise 0. 
 
2. Methodology 
This paper examines the effect of bank loan ratio as a representative bank monitoring 
level on firm value. The analysis is based on a panel Fixed Effect model, which has a strength 
in controlling unique characteristics of individual firms. However, Tobin’s Q estimated may 
be endogenous with bank loan, because as firm value increases firms are in a better position 
                                                          
2 Larger economy of scale is expected with larger company size. In this case, a positive relation with corporate 
value can be observed. However, as argued by Berger and Ofek (1995), a negative relation is likely when 
overinvestment and cross-subsidization incurs loss of corporate value. 
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to acquire finance from external lenders at better terms. Since the main focus of this paper is 
on the effect of bank loan on firm value, a fixed effect two stage lease squares regression 
(FE2SLS) was run to mitigate the endogeneity issue. The industry mean value of bank loan 
ratio was used as an instrumental variable of bank loan, which is the endogenous explanatory 
variable. This can be a valid variable because, given that firms’ financing decision is affected 
by their competitors and the particular nature of the industry, it has a high correlation with 
individual firms’ bank loan ratio, while individual firm value has a low correlation with the 
industry mean value of bank loan ratio. As for the line of industry, the sub-category of the 
Korean standard industrial classification was used, and the surveyed firms included all 
KOSPI-listed companies as well as companies that are subject to external audit. Data was 
obtained from KIS-value.  
FE2SLS is estimated as follows. In the first stage, within estimator is calculated 
using bank loan ratio as a dependent variable, the industry mean value of bank loan ratio as 
an instrumental variable and other control variables as explanatory variables. In the second 
stage another within estimator is calculated by using the previously projected estimator as an 
explanatory variable for bank loan ratio, and Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable.  
 
(1st stage) Bank loan ratio = F (industry mean value of bank loan ratio, ROA, Equity ratio, 
Tangible fixed asset ratio, Log transformed Total Asset, R&D Expenditure 
ratio, year dummy) 
(2nd stage) Tobin's Q = F (Bank loan ratio estimate, ROA, Equity ratio, Tangible fixed asset 
ratio, Log transformed Total Asset, R&D Expenditure ratio, year dummy) 
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3. Results 
In this paper, analysis was begun without assuming an endogeneity issue in the 
estimation model. Firm value is estimated with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. The 
results are given in table 2-2 below. According to the estimates, firm value decreases as bank 
loan ratio increases before the 2008 global financial crisis (Model (2)). This result might be 
due to the self-selection based endogeneity problem, as troubled companies that were not 
properly evaluated in the capital market had no choice but to raise bank loan ratio, as they 
could not issue bonds and borrowing from banks was less costly. FE2SLS estimation was 
conducted, using the industry mean value of bank loan ratio as an instrumental variable for 
the bank loan ratio. The results are given below for Model (3) to Model (5).  
The results of the FE2SLS estimation showed a negative correlation between the 
bank loan ratio and firm value in the period after the 2008 global financial crisis, conflicting 
with the results of the Fixed Effect estimation. No significant results were found in the pre-
crisis period. Given the overall financial market condition where banks have implemented 
business restructuring in earnest since 2010 amid heightened default risks, the outcomes of 
Model (5)—firm value assessed in the stock market was lower for a firm with a higher bank 
loan ratio—suggests that banks’ influence on firms could have negative effect on firm value. 
That is, when default risks escalate, the creditor bank has greater influence on firms with a 
higher bank loan ratio, and influence is likely to be exercised in a way that increases the 
probability of recovering loans instead of increasing firm value in the case of a rising default 
risk. In this case, the enhanced bank monitoring function driven by a higher bank loan ratio 
could negatively influence firm value because bank's goal would be to enhance the possibility 
of collecting existing loans. 
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Table 2-2. The Results of Estimation: Dependent variable is Tobin's Q 
Variable 
FE1) FE2SLS 
2003 - 2013 
(1) 
2003 - 2007 
(2) 
2003 - 2013 
(3) 
2003 - 2007 
(4) 
2008-2013 
(5) 
Bank Loan 
Ratio -0.0002 -0.0025
** -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0227*** 
ROA 0.0042*** 0.0066*** 0.0041*** 0.0066*** 0.0001 
Equity Ratio -0.0047*** -0.0070*** -0.0051*** -0.0070*** -0.0063*** 
Fixed Asset 
Ratio -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0012
** -0.0002 0.0017* 
Ln(Total asset) -0.0929*** -0.1103 -0.0857*** -0.1098** -0.0961*** 
R&D ratio 0.0267** 0.0417** 0.0292** 0.0417*** 0.0202** 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.1488 0.3159 0.1394 0.3159 0.00 
Observations 
(Groups) 
5880 
(611) 
2415 
(517) 
5880 
(611) 
2415 
(517) 
3465 
(610) 
1) The standard errors allow for intragroup correlation ; the observations are independent 
across firms but not necessarily within firms. 
2) *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
To further verify the finding that banks’ influence negatively affects firm value when 
default risks escalate, the relationship between the bank loan ratio and firm value was 
analyzed for financially troubled companies with an interest coverage ratio below 1. Using 
the same methods, Fixed Effect estimation and FE2SLS estimation were conducted to yield 
results as shown in Table 2-3. 
The estimation results showed that the coefficient that represents the influence of the 
bank loan ratio on firm value was lower by 0.0014~0.0043 for financially troubled companies 
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compared to companies in financially sound condition. Particularly, according to the results 
of the FE2SLS estimation which takes the endogeneity issue into account, the discrepancy of 
the same coefficient between the two groups of companies was 0.0043 in Model (3) which 
analyzed the entire survey period, and the discrepancy was even greater in Model (4) at 
0.0078, which analyzed the period after the global financial crisis. These findings show that a 
higher bank loan ratio negatively affects firm value, especially for firms with a high default 
risk.  
Table 2-3. The Results of Estimation : Dependent variable is Tobin's Q 
Variable 
FE (1) FE1) (2) FE2SLS (3) FE2SLS (4) 
2003 - 2013 2003 - 2013 2003 - 2013 2008 - 2013 
Bank Loan Ratio 
(A) 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0267
*** 
Symptoms of 
Insolvency 
Dummy(SID) (B) 
-0.0346** -0.0346** -0.0069 0.0378 
Interaction Term 
(A*B) -0.0014
** -0.0014* -0.0043*** -0.0078*** 
ROA 0.0029*** 0.0029** 0.0030*** -0.0006 
Equity Ratio -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0053*** -0.0065*** 
Fixed Asset Ratio -0.0017*** -0.0017 -0.0015*** 0.0020*** 
Ln(Total asset) -0.0993*** -0.0993*** -0.0936*** -0.0826*** 
R&D ratio 0.0302*** 0.0302** 0.0331*** 0.0422*** 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.1587 0.1587 0.1593 0.1593 
Observations 
(Groups) 
5593 
(604) 
5593 
(604) 
5593 
(604) 
5593 
(604) 
1) The standard errors allow for intra group correlation; the observations are independent 
across firms but not necessarily within firms. 
2) *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
 47 
 
Next, the hypothesis that for firms with a centralized ownership the higher bank loan 
ratio positively affects firm value due to stronger external monitoring on controlling 
shareholder was tested. In companies with a centralized ownership large shareholders or 
management have an incentive to pursue personal interests instead of endeavoring to enhance 
firm value; stronger monitoring by the creditor banks could deter such improper activities. 
Table 2-4 shows the results of Fixed Effect (Model (1)) estimation and Fixed Effect 2 Stage 
Least Squares (FE2SLS, Model (2)) estimation. For firms with a centralized ownership—
where the largest shareholder and shareholders with special interests have 36% or more 
shares—the coefficient that shows the influence of the bank loan ratio on firm value was 
greater by 0.0027 and 0.0087, respectively, compared to companies with a more distributed 
ownership structure.  
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Table 2-4. The Results of Estimation: Dependent variable is Tobin's Q 
Variable 
FE1) (1)  FE2SLS (2) 
2003 - 2013  2003 - 2013 
Bank Loan Ratio (A) -0.0020**  -0.0082** 
Concentrated Ownership 
Dummy(COD) (B) -0.1156
***  -0.1656*** 
Interaction Term 
(A*B) 0.0028
**  0.0087*** 
ROA 0.0042***  0.0042*** 
Equity Ratio -0.0046***  -0.0049*** 
Fixed Asset Ratio -0.0015  -0.0013*** 
Ln(Total asset) -0.0963***  -0.0922** 
R&D ratio 0.0241*  0.0280*** 
Year Dummy Yes  Yes 
Within R2 0.1581  0.1592 
Observations 
(Groups) 
5880 
(611)  
5880 
(611) 
1) The standard errors allow for intragroup correlation ; the observations are independent 
across firms but not necessarily within firms. 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ⅳ. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS 
 The analysis results so far show that the impact of bank loan proportion on corporate 
value can differ according to the characteristics of the companies. This section examines this 
relationship from a different perspective. Section 3 conducted a panel analysis using yearly 
data regarding the financial institution loans that were extracted from the balance sheet of 
companies. This chapter investigates the impact of Main Debtor Group (MDG), a unique 
bank monitoring system in Korea. That is, instead of measuring with bank loan proportion, 
the influence from banks on companies can be identified by whether or not the company is 
included in MDG. Since the companies that belong to MDG receive much stronger 
monitoring from creditor banks compared to other companies, it is surmised that positive or 
negative effects of bank monitoring according to the characteristics of individual firms can be 
observed more clearly. 
 
1. Main Debtor Group (MDG) System and Corporate Evaluation from Credit Banks  
 MDG system in Korea is a core system implemented in the 1970s that has an 
ultimate goal of enhancing the asset soundness of the financial companies. For this purpose, 
financial institutions such as banks act as a creditor who controls the reckless management 
of companies that occur as firms pursue business expansion through financial institution 
loans and complex money transactions with affiliates and enhance their corporate financial 
structure. This system was not only actively used in the corporate restructuring that was 
implemented after the Asian financial crisis in 1998, but until recently also played a 
significant role in the restructuring of insolvent enterprises. MDG selection criterion is 
when the credit exposure of the whole affiliates at the end of the previous year exceeds 0.1% 
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of the credit exposure of the total financial companies. MDG and the firms belonging to it 
are announced early-April of every year. Main Bank, which is selected among the credit 
financial institutions, evaluates the credit risk of MDG until late-April of every year and 
exercises necessary procedures such as MOU signing for improving financial structure 
according to the evaluation results.  
 Meanwhile, banks conduct credit risk evaluation on individual companies 
separately from the MDG system. The evaluation of the large companies with a total credit 
exposure over 50 billion KRW takes place between April and June of every year, while the 
credit risk evaluation of small and medium sized companies is conducted between June and 
October. When the evaluation results indicate necessity of financial structure improvement 
with high risk of insolvency, banks lead the restructuring process.  
 As such, restructuring of insolvent companies used to be led by creditor banks in 
Korea. It is conjectured that corporate restructuring by the market was difficult due to 
environmental factors, such as an immature capital market. Hence, this paper examines the 
impact of a series of bank monitoring activities such as corporate credit risk evaluation 
conducted by banks (including the MDG system) on each of the firms with a high 
possibility of insolvency and firms with concentrated ownership structure. In other words, 
the event that this paper attempts to analyze is the designation and announcement of MDG 
(April 5th) and the announcement of credit risk evaluation results for large companies with 
their credit exposure over 50 billion KRW (June 25th). The MDG firms and those belonging 
to it are publicly announced on the website of the Financial Supervisory Commission every 
April. However, the results of the MDG credit risk evaluation that is conducted until late 
April are not announced separately. Next, credit risk evaluation for large companies with a 
credit exposure over 50 billion KRW is conducted between April and June of every year 
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and the results are announced through press release of the Financial Supervisory Service 
around June; however, information such as the name of the companies is excluded. This 
paper examines the impact of the events that took place in 2010 on the stock price. Due to 
the aggravated macroeconomic environment after the global financial crisis in 2008, a 
number of companies mainly centered on construction, shipping and shipbuilding faced 
managerial difficulties. Creditor banks, which continued its stance on encouraging 
autonomous restructuring of companies until 2009, began to show an intention of 
promoting active restructuring from 2010 following poor visible results. As such, 2010 was 
the year that the monitoring activities of banks on companies was further strengthened. As 
was assumed in section 2, if the reinforcement of bank monitoring negatively affects 
corporate value in the case of those with a high possibility of insolvency while positively 
impacting companies that have a concentrated ownership structure, stock prices will also 
respond to the series of events in the same direction. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 This paper computed normal rate of return by using a market model, and computed 
Abnormal Return (AR), which is a difference with actual rate of return, and CARi(τ1 , τ2), 
which is a Cumulative Abnormal Return from period τ1 to τ2, as below. (McKinlay, 1997) 
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 The period for estimating the normal rate of return was set at 160 days. The 
estimating period (mid-July in 2009 to early-March in 2010) was determined so that the 
impact of the announcement of the credit risk evaluation results for large companies in 2009 
(June 11th) could be mitigated as much as possible, while also removing the impact of the 
MDG announcement in 2010 (April 5th).  
 In this paper, change of CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) three, five, seven and 
eleven days after the event was examined through a Cross-Sectional Model Analysis shown 
below. McKinlay (1997) argued that ƞj can be estimated using the usual OLS if it has no 
Cross-Sectional correlation and satisfies the homoscedasticity. 
 
 
 Table 2-5 presents the basic statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The 
analysis sample included 565 companies with a December fiscal-year end and as of 2010 
were listed on the stock market. Among them, 135 were firms that belong to the MDG group, 
which accounts for approximately 24%. Meanwhile, the sample was divided into a group of 
firms with symptoms of insolvency and a group of firms with concentrated ownership 
structure according to the corporate characteristics. The firms with interest coverage ratio 
below one were classified as firms with symptoms of insolvency. Among 536 companies for 
which data was available, 112 companies belonged to this group, which accounts for 
approximately 21%. Next, firms with a controlling shareholder ownership percentage over 36% 
were classified as firms with a concentrated ownership structure, with 377 out of the total 565 
firms (approximately 67%) belonging to this group. This section analyzes the corporate 
monitoring effects of Korean banks according to the individual corporate characteristics 
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through an event study on the MDG designation and announcement in 2010 (April 5th, Event 
1) and announcement of credit risk evaluation results for large companies (June 25th, Event 2). 
 Table 2-5. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Number (Value = 1) Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Main Debtor Group 
(MDG) Dummy 565 135 0.2389 - - -  
Symptoms of Insolvency 
Dummy(SID)1) 536 112 0.2090 - - -  
Concentrated Ownership 
Dummy(COD)2) 565 377 0.6673 - - -  
Event 1 
(MDG 
Release) 
CAR (-1, +1) 559 - -0.0048 -0.0107 0.0707 -0.2474 0.4449 
CAR (-1, +3) 559 - 0.0065 -0.0022 0.0832 -0.4907 0.5976 
CAR (-1, +5) 559 - 0.0088 0.0029 0.0956 -0.6658 0.7435 
CAR (-1, +9) 559 - 0.0141 0.0018 0.1244 -0.7820 1.0429 
Event 2 
(Large 
Corporate 
Evaluation 
Release) 
CAR (-1, +1) 559 - 0.0052 0.0009 0.0443 -0.2573 0.3063 
CAR (-1, +3) 559 - 0.0072 0.0033 0.0634 -0.2927 0.6103 
CAR (-1, +5) 559 - 0.0154 0.0060 0.0776 -0.2595 0.6635 
CAR (-1, +9) 559 - 0.0114 0.0004 0.1007 -0.3373 0.8583 
 1) Given to 1 if Interest Coverage Ratio is less than 1, otherwise 0. 
 2) Given to 1 if common shares controlling shareholders have exceed 35%, otherwise 0. 
 
3. Results 
 Figure 2-1 shows the movements of CAR(τ1 , τ2) mean difference between MDG and 
non-MDG groups during the period of enhanced bank monitoring around the events of MDG 
designation(April 5th) and credit risk evaluation(June 25th). This figure shows that the stock 
prices of firms belonging to MDG were negatively affected by the event of MDG designation 
compared to other firms.  
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Figure 2-1. CAR movement between MDG and non-MDG groups 
 
 Table 2-6 presents the results of the test of whether there are any differences in 
CARi(τ1 , τ2) between MDG firms and other firms. A statistically significant difference of 
CARi(τ1 , τ2) was observed after the MDG designation and announcement according to 
whether or not a firm is a MDG member, while no statistically significant difference was 
observed before the announcement. 
Table 2-6. CAR mean difference test between groups before and after MDG announcement. 
 Obs CAR (-7,-3) 
CAR 
(-3,-1) 
CAR 
(-3,+3) 
CAR 
(-1,+3) 
CAR 
(-1,+9) 
Non-MDG 
(value = 0) 425 0.0063 0.0036 0.0156 0.0107 0.0182 
MDG 
(value=1) 134 0.0037 -0.0077 -0.0086 -0.0069 0.0012 
t-value  0.5317 2.1374 3.279 2.8353 1.7125 
* t-value for H0 : differ = mean(0) - mean(1) = 0. Bold-faced fonts indicate rejection at 5% 
level. 
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 Next, we analyzed whether the companies belonging to the MDG represent the 
differentiated stock return according to the possibility of insolvency or the ownership 
structure. Firms with a higher possibility of insolvency were defined as those with an interest 
coverage ratio less than 1; this accounted for 23 out of a total of 131 companies (18%).  
Firms with an ownership structure where the ratio of controlling shareholders' rights exceeds 
36%  accounted for 81 out of a total 134 companies (60%). 
 Table 2-7 presents the results of a regression analysis studying the differentiated 
impacts of  MDG designation and announcement on corporate stock price between MDG and 
non-MDG firms. Stronger monitoring and influence from creditor banks is expected when a 
firm is designated as a MDG company. The analysis tested a hypothesis that differentiation 
effects can be created in the case of firms with symptoms of insolvency and those with a high 
percentage ownership by the controlling shareholder. 
 Firms with symptoms of insolvency that have an interest coverage ratio below one 
showed negative significant impact on CAR. Meanwhile, firms with concentrated ownership 
structure where the percentage ownership of the controlling shareholder exceeds 36% did 
show a positive impact on stock price after the MDG announcement event. Next, the impact 
of the announcement event of credit risk evaluation results on stock prices in large companies 
that have a credit exposure over 50 billion won was examined. However, a meaningful result 
around the event was not found. 
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Table 2-7. Regression analysis results of CAR after MDG designation and announcement date 
Dependent 
Variable 
CAR CAR CAR 
(-1, +3) (-3, +3) (-1, +9) 
    
Symptoms of 
Insolvency 
Dummy(SID) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0472*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0358* 
(0.076) 
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Dummy(COD) 
0.0184* 
(0.068) 
0.0237* 
(0.058) 
0.0394** 
(0.025) 
Ln(Total Trading 
Volume) 
0.0002 
(0.936) 
0.0010 
(0.759) 
0.0027 
(0.508) 
Ln(Average 
Price) 
-0.0007 
(0.829) 
-0.0012 
(0.765) 
-0.0101* 
(0.078) 
Constant -0.0058 (0.912) 
-0.0147 
(0.825) 
0.0528 
(0.582) 
Observations 131 131 131 
Adj. R^2 0.0646 0.0663 0.0626 
F-Value 3.24 3.31 3.17 
 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
 The results above imply that the effects of strengthening bank monitoring can have a 
positive impact on stock prices in firms that have a concentrated ownership structure, while 
showing negative impacts in those with symptoms of insolvency. This is consistent with the 
panel data analysis results of the previous section. 
 
Ⅴ. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the effect of bank financing on corporate value was examined through a 
study of KOSPI listed companies from 2003 to 2013. Bank loan ratio was used as a proxy 
variable for the level of monitoring, to examine whether stronger bank monitoring increases 
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firm value. For the analysis, a panel Fixed Effect estimation and Fixed Effect 2 Stage Least 
Squares (FE2SLS) estimation were conducted—the latter uses the industry mean value of the 
bank loan ratio as an instrumental variable to consider endogeneity issue. The analysis results 
showed that a higher bank loan ratio negatively affected firm value for financially troubled 
companies with an interest coverage ratio below 1, in the period following the 2008 global 
financial crisis when default risks escalated. As for companies with a centralized ownership 
structure where controlling shareholders have 36% or more shares, higher bank loan ratios 
positively affected firm value. When default risks rise, the higher the bank loan ratio, the 
more likely creditor banks are to exercise their influence in a way that increases the 
probability of recovering their credits, which might undermine shareholder value in the short 
term. In comparison, for companies with a centralized ownership structure, controlling 
shareholders might pursue personal interests; in this case, higher bank loan ratios could deter 
such activities through stronger monitoring by creditor banks.  
Moreover, this study also confirmed that bank monitoring effects can differ between 
firms with symptoms of insolvency and those with a concentrated ownership structure 
through an event study analysis. That is, according to the results of analysis regarding the 
impact of the announcement of MDG designation, negative effects were observed in firms 
with symptoms of insolvency and positive effects were observed in firms with a high 
percentage ownership of a controlling shareholder. However, this paper used a very simple 
criteria—interest coverage ratio below 1—as the proxy variable representing the default 
possibility, because this criteria is broadly used and accepted as a typical simple criteria for 
insolvent firms. Future study using a continuous estimated value of default probability 
instead of applying dummy variable is recommended.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FACTORS DRIVING THE PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION OF SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITIES : EVIDENCE FROM KOREAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Korean Savings banks that expanded the number of high-risk loans experienced huge defaults 
after the 2008 global financial crisis. We consider the prompt corrective action (PCA) to 
analyze factors that drive savings banks to failure given that an order for PCA by a 
supervisory authority normally leads to defaults. We conduct discrete choice models to 
estimate the probability of PCA, using 2005 to 2011 data on 103 Korean savings banks. We 
find that the post-examination actions taken by supervisory authorities and a rapid increase in 
loans increase the possibility of PCA. These results suggest that depositors and the market 
can reduce the costs incurred from defaults by identifying information that predicts PCA. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 After the 2008 global financial crisis, a considerable number of savings banks in 
Korea collapsed. Twenty-five savings banks, including the largest in terms of asset size, were 
ordered by Korean financial supervisory authorities to close business for the period of 2008 
to 2012. The closure of savings banks in Korea is unsurprising given the development 
trajectory of the banking industry in the country.  
 Savings banks were established in 1972 to provide financial services primarily to the 
household sector, after which these institutions went through a series of restructuring and 
improvement schemes to guarantee financial performance. The outbreak of the 1997 financial 
crisis gave rise to the aggressive expansion of commercial banks that were allowed to provide 
lending services. These developments spelled fierce competition for Korean savings banks. 
Under this backdrop, Korean savings banks expanded project financing for the real estate 
sector to gain growth momentum, but this move resulted in a large number of bankruptcies 
after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 The calamitous bankruptcy of savings banks translated into tremendous social costs, 
with customers who invested in subordinated debts and deposited amounts that exceeded the 
deposit insurance limit incurring massive losses. Financial authorities, such as the Financial 
Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), were criticized for 
their belated response and lack of consumer protection. More specifically, criticisms included 
their lax supervision and postponement of prompt corrective action (PCA) on savings banks 
that are at high risk of bankruptcy. 
 PCA primarily aims to rule out regulatory forbearance and minimize loss from deposit 
insurance funds by implementing preemptive actions in accordance with capital ratio and 
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management evaluation results; this process results in the immediate closure or suspension of 
problematic savings banks (Choi and Sohn, 2014). Korea adopted the PCA regulation for the 
banking sector in 1992 and for other sub-sectors, such as savings banks, in 1999. Three types 
of PCAs are implemented, depending on degree of insolvency: management improvement 
recommendation, demand, and order. From 2003 to 2011, supervisory authorities 
implemented 75 corrective actions, specifically broken down to 19 management 
improvement recommendations, 16 demands, and 40 orders. Among these, 18 corrective 
actions were postponed after authorities approved the recapitalization plans submitted by the 
savings banks (White Paper, 2012). 
 This paper examines the possible association of the PCAs imposed on savings banks 
with the financial variables of savings banks, supervisory action and policy, and regional 
economic conditions. This issue is important because PCA normally drives savings banks to 
opt for failure.3 Should PCA be predictable, depositors and the market can reduce the costs 
incurred from defaults because they will be able to identify the factors that drive PCA. 
Accordingly, the supervisory authority also can reduce the cost arising from failures through 
an early intervention in problematic banks. In particular, we are interested in whether PCA 
measures are related to supervisory authorities’ onsite examination results and whether 
savings banks whose services are characterized by rapidly increasing loans (especially real 
estate loans) are likely to be subjected to PCA. In 2006, Korean supervisory authorities 
introduced an incentive scheme to improve the financial soundness of savings banks. This 
scheme, called the “8-8 club,” eases the loan restrictions imposed on savings banks with 
                                                          
3 Out of 47 cases of PCA in our sample, 41 savings banks ended up with a default and only 6 were revived 
through recapitalization. However, those 6 banks were considered failures as they have a high probability of 
another PCA because the recapitalization only marginally improved their financial soundness.  
 65 
 
capital adequacy and asset soundness. We also investigate whether this incentive scheme 
decreases the probability of PCA measures being imposed on savings banks that fall under 
the 8-8 club scheme. 
 We use discrete choice models to estimate the probability of PCA, using 2005 to 2011 
data on 103 Korean savings banks as the sample. Our results show that the post-examination 
actions of supervisory entities effectively predict PCA. Return on asset (ROA) and non-
performing loans that measure profitability and asset soundness are good PCA predictors. We 
also find that high loan growth and poor regional economic indicators increase the possibility 
of PCA and the failure of savings banks. By contrast, the 8-8 club policy is a statistically non-
significant factor in explaining PCA despite its contribution to the high increase in loans.  
 This paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the history and recent 
developments in the savings bank industry in Korea. We then explain the supervisory system, 
focusing on PCA and onsite examination. Relevant literature is presented next. To analyze 
the factors that drive savings banks to opt for failures, we set up the regression models and 
examine data. The final sections provide the empirical results and conclusions.  
 
Ⅱ. SAVINGS BANKS IN KOREA 
 In 1972, savings banks were established in Korea to foster financial intermediation 
between individuals and small businesses, in accordance with the Actions of 
Institutionalization of the Informal Credit Market.4 Since the enactment of the law, savings 
                                                          
4 The Korean government absorbed private loan companies into the financial system in 1972 and enacted the 
Savings Company Act. Because the government pushed for export-oriented growth policies, bank funding could 
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banks have continued to attract social interest because of bankruptcy and corruption-related 
problems, such as illegal lending and embezzlement by owners.  
 Following the 1997 IMF bailout, savings banks faced structural changes in the 
business environment. They were exposed to severe competition from large commercial 
banks and private lenders. Commercial banks expanded the amount of available mortgage 
loans and reduced the supply of business loans given decreased demand from the corporate 
sector. The removal of regulations for asset allocation in commercial banks also contributed 
to the increased competition. Savings banks were confronted with additional competition 
from private lenders, which aggressively expanded their business for low-credit clients. 
Savings banks then suffered a downturn in the local economy. To cope with this situation, 
savings banks provided high-risk and high-yield loan portfolio services, such as real estate 
project financing. This strategy was possible because of stable funding from deposits, on 
which the banks imposed interest rates higher than those imposed by commercial banks. 
Stable funding also came from the increased deposit insurance of up to 50 million won, 
which is the same as the amount of commercial banks.  
Meanwhile, the government pursued policies to support savings bank profitability. 
These measures included an increase in the deposit insurance limit (from 20 million won to 
50 million won) in 2001; the change in institutional category from “mutual savings and 
finance company” to “savings bank” in 2002; the approval of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) between savings banks in 2005; a partial easing of credit limit restrictions for high-
performing savings banks that satisfy a BIS ratio of 8% and non-performing loan of 8%, (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not cover the needs of the households or local businesses, driving these customers to turn to private loan 
companies. These developments caused serious socio-economic problems. 
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the 8-8 club); and the allowance for the opening of specialized branch offices in 2006.5  
 After the 2008 global financial crisis, a considerable number of savings banks in 
Korea collapsed. This period is characterized by a series of defaults with a large scale for a 
relatively short period. Given the 2008 financial crisis, project finance loans deteriorated and 
savings banks suffered from insolvency. In particular, the 8-8 club policy that eases credit 
restrictions for high-performing savings banks provided the momentum for the rapid rise in 
project financing. Savings banks eligible to the club received regulatory exemption of a credit 
limit amounting to 8 billion won.6 This policy contributed to increasing the asset growth of 
qualified savings banks.  
 
Ⅲ. SUPERVISORY ACTIONS AND MEASURES 
 Since 1998, Korea has implemented a concrete PCA trigger system for problematic 
financial institutions. When capital ratio or management evaluation results fall below the 
minimum criteria, the supervisory entities take necessary prompt and appropriate actions to 
correct the problem. PCA regulation is a system that is designed to minimize the social costs 
arising from the insolvency of financial institutions; these social costs include financial 
                                                          
5After the government lifted the regulation on securities investment between high-performing savings 
banks that have a BIS ratio of more than 7%, eight M&As occurred.   
6 Credit exposure to a single person (individual or business entity) must be less than 20% of the 
company's equity capital. No savings bank may expose more than 25% of its total capital to an inter-
linked business group in loans. Loans to individual borrowers are limited to 500 million won, and 
loans to small businesses and other corporate entities are limited to 8 billion won.  
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damage to depositors and the exhaustion of deposit insurance funds. This strategy stabilizes 
the financial system at a preliminary stage.7 The PCA system is advantageous in minimizing 
the default risk encountered by financial institutions through reinforced market discipline, 
and reduces costs incurred from dealing with insolvent financial firms by motivating self-
directed effort. At the same time, objective assessment focused on financial soundness helps 
create a level playing field for small and large financial institutions.8  
 Three types of PCAs are implemented : (1) management improvement 
recommendation for savings banks with a “BIS ratio under 5%” or a “composite rating 3 or 
higher, and asset or capital rating 4 or lower in management evaluation"; (2) management 
improvement demand for savings banks with a “BIS ratio under 3%” or a “composite rating  
4 or lower in management evaluation"; and (3) management improvement order for savings 
banks with a “BIS ratio under 1%” or "with liabilities exceeding the assets" (FSS Handbook, 
2011). Savings banks on which PCA measures are imposed must submit a rehabilitation plan 
to the FSS within one month from the date of the PCA. If the savings banks fail to satisfy this 
requirement, they will be subjected to more stringent PCA measures. Continued failure to 
comply will result in a business suspension. 
 The PCA and onsite examinations may be correlated. The examinations involve the 
                                                          
7 The PCA may lead to a sudden deposit outflow from the savings banks subject to the PCA and hurt market 
stability. However, if we compare the cases of defaults with and without a PCA, it is difficult to deny the 
positive role of PCA: protecting disciplined depositors and minimizing the deposit insurance fund. This is 
particularly true in circumstances when the financial statement does not provide reliable risk information. 
8 Although the main purpose of PCAs is to preclude regulatory forbearance, the law allows regulators to take 
discretionary action. The regulator sometimes chooses not to enforce a PCA for a particular savings bank for 
some period. 
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general evaluation of financial institution's operations and management including the 
compliance of regulations. In other words, the examination result can contain information 
representing the institution's capacity that is difficult to detect using financial variables.9 The 
problems detected during the examinations result in various supervisory actions, including 
sanctions. The examination results are reported to the company and disclosed to the public on 
the webpage of the supervisory authorities within two days of the report. The government 
recommends that the supervisory authorities release more information for the purpose of 
improving market surveillance. 
 Market discipline in Korea’s savings bank industry is difficult to accomplish because 
the savings banks are characterized by weak governance such as frequent frauds committed 
by major shareholders, limited public disclosure of financial data, and rare financing by the 
market. Therefore, the Korean savings banks industry is compelled to rely on the supervisory 
and examination functions of regulatory authorities in controlling the risks encountered by 
savings banks. 
 
Ⅳ. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Many researchers have investigated the failure of savings. They analyzed the causes 
of savings bank defaults through the failure prediction model. Nam and Jin (1998) and Chang 
and Kim (2004) use ROA and sub-standard loan ratio variables as explanatory variables. 
                                                          
9 Examination of savings banks in Korea focuses primarily on major shareholders’ illegal lending and activities. 
Despite the weakened function of examination with less resource allocation resulting from the pursuit of risk-
focused examinations, the most crucial part of examining savings banks lies in how fast vulnerability factors are 
identified and how insolvency is prevented through appropriate measures. 
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Kang et al (2013) propose the usefulness of BIS capital ratio and debt ratio as the predictor of 
savings banks' failure. 
 Since the global financial crisis, studies about the relationship between savings banks 
and real estate markets have emerged.10 An and Choi (2008) analyze the effect of changes in 
real estate prices on the profitability of savings banks. They argue that real estate prices are 
highly related to savings bank profitability; a decrease in price disproportionally diminishes 
profitability. Many other studies also show a positive relationship between real estate price 
fluctuations and bank profitability (Hilbers et al. 2001; Arpa et al. 2001; Davis and zhu 2009).  
 Financial policy and ownership problems can be regarded as potential risk factors in 
savings banks. Although many studies (Beck et al. 2006; Chen 2007; Gonzalez 2005) 
propose that deregulation, such as the removal of entry barriers, fosters competition and 
improves sound bank performance, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) contend that 
competition encourages taking more risk by reducing banks’ franchise values.11 They propose 
a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. Regarding the 
relationship between ownership structure and bank risk-taking, many studies reveal a positive 
relationship between strong ownership and high risk-taking (Saunders et al, 1990; Anderson 
and Fraser, 2000; Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
 This paper is different in that it examines the association of the PCAs imposed on 
savings banks not only with the major financial variables of savings banks but also with the 
results of onsite examinations, a particular financial policy called the 8-8 club, and regional 
                                                          
10 These studies are based on the history that savings banks exposed to fierce competition with commercial 
banks and private lenders aggressively increased real estate Project Financing loan as the blue ocean market . 
11 Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) also propose that banks in high competition tend to pursue higher risk. 
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economic status. This issue is important because PCA normally drives savings banks to opt 
for failures and if PCA is predictable, the market can reduce the costs incurred from defaults 
by identifying the factors that drive PCA.  
 
Ⅴ. DATA AND METHODS 
 We conduct probit and logit regressions to estimate the probability of PCA, using 
2005 to 2011 data on 103 savings banks. We regress a dependent variable, PCA, against 
explanatory variables in the previous year to examine the driving factors of PCA. In addition, 
we use annual data based on the fiscal year of savings banks instead of the calendar year. For 
example, the fiscal year for 2005 covers July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006. Such fiscal year data 
afford us the advantage of using reliable high-quality data audited by external accounting 
firms.12  
 We examine the factors that can predict the implementation of PCA measures by 
supervisory authorities. We use regional macroeconomic data as well as various financial 
data on savings banks that have been frequently investigated in previous research. We also 
include the vulnerabilities of savings banks measured by onsite examination, enabling us to 
identify the dangers faced by savings banks in an environment characterized by a lack of 
reliable financial information on savings banks. Finally, we investigate whether 8-8 club 
membership decreases the probability that PCA measures. 
 We hypothesize (1) rapid loan growth and high exposure to the real estate sector 
                                                          
12 This advantage is critical because savings banks in Korea often falsify financial statements to 
conceal their actual financial status. 
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increase the probability of PCA; (2) poor results from supervisory examination increase the 
probability of PCA; (3) the incentive regulatory policy, the 8-8 club, decreases the probability 
of PCA.13 
 The dependent variable is the dummy, which is assigned a value of 1 if a savings bank 
is subjected to PCA and 0 otherwise. Most of the savings banks on which PCA is imposed 
face business suspension and asset and liability transfer to other financial institutions. 
Therefore, we can regard PCA as an avenue for the initial release of default information.  
 
Table 3-1. The number of savings banks subject to PCA 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Non-PCA 90 87 86 89 83 71 60 
PCA 3 5 4 2 10 12 11 
Total 93 92 90 91 93 83 71 
   
 In this paper, we consider the dependent variable as the occurrence of events designed 
to satisfy the trigger conditions of PCA, regardless of whether the PCA is imposed or not. In 
other words, we include the case where the PCA condition is satisfied, but the PCA is not 
imposed by a supervisor’s discretionary decision.14 This inclusion is beneficial in deriving a 
                                                          
13 One can hypothesize differently that the 8-8 club policy, which removes the credit limit for qualified savings 
banks, contributes to increasing the default risk by inducing rapid loan growth. 
14 An incentive for the regulatory forbearance of regulatory authorities is provided for various reasons, such as 
the stabilization of the market and the concealment of supervisory failure (Kane, 1986, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 
1993). 
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more objective point, eliminating the forbearance of the regulator.15 Table 3-1 shows the 
summary statistics of the failure variables.  
Table 3-2. Description of variables 
Variable Description Data source 
 
Financial variables  
 
Ln(Total loan) 
 
Ln(Real estate loan) 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
Non-performing loan 
 
 
 
Log of total loan 
 
Log of loan to real estate sector, including 
project financing  
 
Return on asset ratio (the ratio of revenue 
to asset value)  
 
Ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans 
 
 
 
Financial  
Supervisory 
Service  
Regional economy 
 
Ln(Manufacturing  
index) 
 
 
 
 
Log of the manufacturing production 
index in each province 
 
 
Korea Statistics 
Information  
System 
 
Supervisory information 
 
Supervisory actions 
 
 
Examination dummy 
 
 
 
8-8 club dummy 
 
 
Number of supervisory actions prompted 
by onsite examination 
 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if there 
is onsite examination; the value is 0 
otherwise 
 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
BIS ratio is above 8% and the non-
performing loan ratio is below 8%; the 
value is 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
Financial  
Supervisory 
Service 
 
                                                          
15 Choi and Shon (2014) report the undesirable consequences of the regulatory forbearance – the deterioration of 
depositors market discipline and a resultant increase in social cost. They analyze the effects of regulatory 
forbearance measures on market discipline, such as the postponement of PCA, and argue that where there is 
regulatory forbearance for savings banks with deteriorated asset soundness, depositors in relevant and 
neighboring savings banks become less sensitive to the risks encountered by savings banks.  
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 Table 3-2 shows the description of the explanatory variables, which can be classified 
into three groups. The first comprises the various financial variables of savings banks: (1) log 
of total loan, (2) log of loan to real estate sector, including project financing, (3) ROA ratio 
(the ratio of revenue to asset value), and (4) ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.16  
 The second includes the log of the manufacturing production index in each province, 
thereby allowing us to control for regional economic status. We choose the average value of 
manufacturing production index matched well with savings banks' fiscal year instead of the 
regional GDP because the former is released quarterly. 
 The third group of variables comprises two types of supervisory information: (1) the 
number of supervisory actions prompted by onsite examinations and a dummy variable of 
examination and (2) a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 at a BIS ratio higher than 8% 
and a non-performing loan ratio below 8%, that is to say, a savings bank qualified as an 8-8 
club member. The post-examination supervisory actions show the banks’ general weaknesses 
and deficiencies, identified through the examinations. An FSS-commissioned white paper 
(2012) on savings banks report how advantageous the policy was in increasing capital.17  
 Table 3-3 presents the summary statistics derived on the basis of whether the banks 
are subjected to PCA. A statistically significant mean difference exists between the two 
groups of savings banks for all the financial variables. The sign of the difference is largely 
consistent with the expected one. Non-performing loans and the number of post-examination 
                                                          
16 We disregard the BIS ratio because it is one of trigger conditions of PCA. 
17 Nevertheless, the policy can also cause negative effects of rapid growth of high-risk loan. Kim and Han (2012) 
indicate that the policy of relaxing the lending restrictions imposed on high-performing savings banks 
negatively influences profitability and asset soundness. 
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supervisory actions are higher in the PCA-subjected group. The log of total loans and real 
estate loans are also higher in the PCA-subjected group, while ROA is lower. 
Table 3-3. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max T-test 
Whole savings banks 
Ln(Total loan) 613 12.353 1.172 7.818 15.218  
Ln(Real estate loan) 520 11.305 1.721 5.011 14.589  
ROA 613 1.002 2.227 -11.040 25.530  
Non-performing loan 613 9.831 7.025 0.110 78.080  
Ln(Manufacturing index) 613 4.487 0.187 3.718 4.768  
Supervisory actions 330 4.855 3.444 1.000 19.000  
Examination dummy 613 0.538 0.499 0 1  
8-8 club dummy 613 0.375 0.485 0 1  
 
Non-PCA savings banks 
Ln(Total loan) 566 12.294 1.160 7.818 15.218  
Ln(Real estate loan) 476 11.215 1.729 5.011 14.589  
ROA 566 1.157 2.156 -11.040 25.530  
Non-performing loan 566 9.389 6.783 0.110 78.080  
Ln(Manufacturing index) 566 4.487 0.189 3.718 4.768  
Supervisory actions 301 4.751 3.341 1.000 19.000  
Examination dummy 566 0.532 0.021 0 1  
8-8 club dummy 566 0.371 0.484 0 1  
 
PCA savings banks 
Ln(Total loan) 47 13.066 1.102 10.846 14.971 -4.39*** 
Ln(Real estate loan) 44 12.286 1.282 9.592 14.446 -4.01*** 
ROA 47 -0.866 2.245 -8.510 2.970 6.16*** 
Non-performing loan 47 15.155 7.751 3.970 32.820 -5.54*** 
Ln(Manufacturing index) 47 4.489 0.163 3.956 4.692 -0.07 
Supervisory actions 29 5.931 4.301 1.000 15.000 -1.77* 
Examination dummy 47 0.617 0.072 0 1 -1.13 
8-8 club dummy 47 0.426 0.499 0 1 -0.74 
Notes: The t-test is statistics on the mean difference between PCA imposed banks and non-PCA banks. 
      ***, **, and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Ⅵ. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 We adopt pooled probit and logit models. Table 3-4 shows the results of a pooled 
probit regression in various specifications. Savings banks with a high loan growth rate are 
more likely to be subjected to PCA; the estimated coefficients are 0.534 and 0.395, which are 
statistically significant at the 1% levels. We also find that high real estate loan growth rate 
and the existence of many non-performing loans increase the probability of PCA and that 
high ROA decreases the probability of failure. The coefficients of regional economy are 
negative and statistically significant, implying that poor economic conditions negatively 
affect the failure of savings banks. We restrict our sample to large savings banks with assets 
greater than 300 billion won to determine whether the effects differ depending on size. 
Savings banks whose assets are greater than KRW 300 billion are under the enhanced 
regulation and closer monitoring of their businesses. The results remain the same, except that 
loan growth rate and regional economy growth rate do not exhibit a statistically significant 
effect on the probability of PCA.  
 An interesting result is that the number of post-examination supervisory actions is a 
meaningful PCA predictor. The coefficients of supervisory actions range from 0.055 to 0.067 
and are statistically significant at 5% or 10%. This result therefore suggests that the post-
examination actions in the previous year can predict the probability of PCA for the current 
year. After onsite examinations, approximately 6 months are usually spent to complete the 
reports and release the results to the public. Therefore, if the supervisory authorities speed up 
the necessary procedures following the examination, markets and depositors have more time 
to prepare for the PCA intended for a specific savings bank. Additionally, we run the 
estimation with the sub-sample of savings banks with assets of more than 300 billion won. 
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The coefficient of the supervisory action variable continues to show predictive power, with a 
magnitude that nearly doubles from 0.067 to 0.125.    
Table 3-4. Probit regression results 
Model ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
( 4 ) 
( Asset size 
> 300 billion) 
Ln(Total loan) 0.534 (5.71)***  
0.395 
(3.31)*** 
0.206 
(0.65) 
Ln(Real estate  
loan)  
  
0.395 
(5.18)***   
ROA 
 
-0.231 
(-4.61)*** 
-0.250 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.217 
(-4.61)*** 
-0.433 
(-4.17)*** 
Non-performing 
loan 
 
0.052 
(3.73)*** 
0.041 
(2.62)*** 
0.060 
(4.21)*** 
0.075 
(2.65)*** 
Ln(Manufacturing 
index) 
-1.598 
(-2.94)*** 
-1.989 
(-2.95)*** 
-1.712 
(-3.02)*** 
-1.070 
(-1.11) 
Supervisory 
actions* 
Examinations 
0.055 
(1.81)* 
0.058 
(1.90)* 
0.067 
(2.11)** 
0.125 
(2.57)*** 
Examinations -0.138 (-0.55) 
-0.098 
(-0.38) 
-0.106 
(-0.42) 
-0.346 
(-0.98) 
8-8 club   
-2.827 
(-1.16) 
-3.490 
(-0.70) 
8-8club * 
Ln(Total loan)   
0.247 
(1.35) 
0.325 
(0.88) 
Constant -1.644 2.416 0.274 -0.510 
Log-likelihood 
value -119.80 -107.722 -117.447 -64.555 
Pseudo R2 0.278 0.285 0.292 0.373 
Observations 613 520 613 291 
 
Note: 1. Parentheses shows t-value. 
          2. ***, **, and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3-5. Logit regression results 
Model ( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) 
( 4 ) 
( Asset size 
> 300 billion) 
Ln(Total loan) 1.041 (5.81)***  
0.787 
(3.50)*** 
0.438 
(1.09) 
Ln(Real estate  
loan)  
  
0.791 
(5.26)***   
ROA 
 
-0.418 
(-4.49)*** 
-0.462 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.395 
(-4.61)*** 
-0.809 
(-4.05)*** 
Non-performing 
loan 
0.101 
(3.78)*** 
0.087 
(2.93)*** 
0.115 
(4.39)*** 
0.157 
(2.88)*** 
Ln(Manufacturing 
index) 
-2.862 
(-2.70)*** 
-3.765 
(-2.83) 
-3.006 
(-2.76)*** 
-1.516 
(-0.69) 
Supervisory 
actions* 
Examinations 
0.105 
(1.84)* 
0.111 
(1.97)** 
0.124 
(2.06)** 
0.256 
(2.72)*** 
Examinations -0.324 (-0.66) 
-0.197 
(-0.39) 
-0.240 
(-0.49) 
-0.893 
(-1.24) 
8-8 club   
-5.477 
(-1.16) 
-4.126 
(-0.62) 
8-8club * 
Ln(Total loan)   
0.468 
(1.32) 
0.437 
(0.85) 
Constant -4.112 -4.100 0.831 -3.301 
Log-likelihood 
value 
-120.507 -108.069 -118.329 -59.924 
Pseudo R2 0.273 0.283 0.287 0.381 
Observations 613 520 613 291 
 
Note: 1. Parentheses shows t-value. 
         2. ***, **, and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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 The post-examination actions taken by the supervisory authorities can be classified 
into three categories: onsite actions for a relatively minor violation, actions that require 
sanctions on savings banks and their staff, and warnings regarding management. We use the 
total number of supervisory actions including minor ones. However, we fail to find statistical 
significance for the coefficient of the variable for the number of supervisory sanctions except 
those imposed for minor violations. This result can be interpreted as the general vulnerability 
of savings banks rather than the extent of the violation being a more important factor in 
predicting PCA.  
 Finally, we reject the hypothesis that the 8-8 club decreases the probability of PCA. 
We do not find statistically significant results, but the negative coefficient of the 8-8 club 
dummy and the positive coefficient of the term for its interaction with loan growth suggest 
that the 8-8 club policy somewhat reduces the probability of PCA, but  contributes to 
increasing this probability by intensifying loan growth.  
 Table 3-5 shows the results of a pooled logit regression in various specifications. The 
results remain qualitatively the same as those for the probit estimations. 
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Ⅶ. CONCLUSIONS 
 We examine the factors that predict PCA implementation by the supervisory 
authorities in Korea—an important issue, given that PCA normally drives savings banks to 
opt for defaults. We contend that PCA predictability will enable the market to reduce the 
costs incurred from defaults. 
 We investigate three major types of information: financial information, regional 
macroeconomic information, and supervisory information. The results show that post-
examination supervisory actions effectively predict PCA. High loan growth and poor regional 
economic indicators also increase the possibility of PCA. By contrast, the 8-8 club policy 
introduced to improve financial soundness is statistically non-significant in explaining PCA.  
In Korea, savings banks try to avoid the PCA measure by reporting a false financial 
statement, including the BIS ratio, which is the most critical in determining PCA measures. 
Therefore, depositors depend much more on regulatory actions than risk information 
disclosed by a savings bank for their deposit and withdrawal decisions. This lack of market 
discipline was also driven by the observation that the most bank failures were triggered by 
regulatory action rather than by bank runs in Korea. Therefore, our results suggest that using 
information on the post-examination actions, loan growth rate, and regional economic 
conditions, the market can predict PCA and reduce the costs incurred from the failure of 
savings banks. 
Our results also suggest that supervisory authorities pay close attention to the 
savings banks that increase their loan exposure rapidly in the economic downturn in their 
main business region when monitoring their risks. In addition, the supervisory authorities 
should consider a negative effect of 8-8 club policy introduced to improve financial 
soundness. It seems that the policy also contributed at least partly to rapid loan growth. 
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